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Under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol, forest projects can 
receive returns for carbon sequestration via two credit instruments: temporary (tCERs) or long-
term certified emission reductions (lCERs). This article develops a theoretical model of optimal 
harvesting strategies that compares private optimal harvest decision under these two instruments.  
Risk-neutral, profit maximizing landowners are likely to prefer instituting lCERs over tCERs. A 
particular type of early harvest penalty implemented under the lCERs is critical in determining 
the length of rotation intervals and the carbon credit supply. When this penalty is an increasing 
function of the difference in biomass before and after harvesting across verification periods, the 
landowner chooses a different rotation interval compared to the Faustmann rotation which may 
be longer or even shorter.  The resulting supply curve may have a backward bending region over 
a range of carbon prices.    2
1. Introduction 
  Given the recent concerns over climate change, various programs and projects have been 
proposed to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Afforestation and reforestation projects have the 
potential to sequester significant amounts of carbon through transpiration of carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases (Binkley and Van Kooten 1994; Cacho et al. 2003; Lee et al. 2005; 
Nordhaus 1991; Richards 1992; Sedjo and Solomon 1989). Under the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol, forest projects can be developed to offset man-made 
carbon emissions and generate carbon credits as temporary or long-term certified emission 
reductions; tCERs and lCERs, respectively (UNFCCC 2003).  
The tCERs and lCERs are carbon emissions offset credits generated by forest owners 
who produce forest biomass verified by the CDM executive. These CERs are purchased by users 
of carbon credits to meet their carbon emissions compliance requirements. The forest owners 
benefit because they are able to generate extra revenues from standing forest biomass. A unit of 
tCER is equal to one metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) sequestered from trees 
(CDM Rulebook, 2009a). These tCERs are valid for use as carbon offsets by obligated parties 
during a five-year commitment period, but not after (UNFCCC 2003).  After the tCER 
commitment period is over, the buyers of CO2e offsets must either contract for more tCERs or 
satisfy their emissions obligations in some other way. 
LCERs are credits generated by a forest owner under a contractual arrangement spanning 
up to 60 years (UNFCCC 2003). Unlike tCERs, lCER accrual is based on incremental additions 
to biomass between multiple, discrete, verification periods (UNFCCC 2006; CDM Rulebook, 
2009b). Accrued lCERs can be used as valid CO2e offsets not only during the commitment 
period between verification periods, but also for the entire crediting period up to 60 years.     3
However, if there is a biomass reduction event between verifications (such as harvest), there will 
be a penalty or reduction in valid accumulated lCERs equal to the reduction in CO2e 
sequestered.
1  If this occurs, obligated parties must satisfy their offset obligations through the 
additional acquisition of CERs or by some other means. The interaction between sequestration 
verification and rotation interval choice is important because harvest leads to a reduction in 
forest biomass.  The specifics of these two instruments affect their relative effectiveness and 
outcomes in terms of carbon sequestration incentives. 
  Only one forest project was approved by the CDM executive that generated tCERs before 
2009, but fourteen more projects were approved by June 2010 (UNFCCC, 2010).  More 
emphasis has been given to understanding the effect of tCERs in forestry projects (Galinato and 
Uchida, 2010, forthcoming). We are not aware of any study that has modeled the impact of 
lCERs on harvesting decisions and carbon credit supply.  
In light of potential increasing reliance on CERs, this article develops a theoretical model 
for examining optimal harvesting strategies based on the value of harvested timber and revenues 
from sequestered carbon under lCERs. We simulate optimal rotation intervals and carbon supply 
curves under the lCERs instrument using our model and compare it with simulations for tCERs. 
Comparing both the mechanisms, tCERs and lCERs, which regulate these forestry projects will 
be a vital tool as they are revised in the future. The theoretical results are applied to Tanzania and 
the Philippines, two developing countries that have the potential to sponsor afforestation and 
reforestation projects to generate lCERs under the CDM. The study also provides a dynamic 
                                                            
1 This is a stylistic representation of the harvest penalty based on the current conceptual framework outlined in the 
modalities and procedures for afforestation and reforestation project activities under CDM (UNFCCC 2003). In 
practice, the penalty in a project depends on negotiations between the buyer and seller of the credits as well as the 
authorizing body under the CDM.    4
framework for measuring the feasibility of a given forest plantation that sequesters carbon under 
this instrument. 
There are two main disadvantages of the tCERs instrument relative to lCERs. First, tCER 
offset creation ceases to exist if the host country or landowner decides to default on the project 
because of the short run implementation of this instrument. Second, because of the shorter term 
nature of tCERs, they are not as compatible with credits generated from national or regional 
emissions trading schemes such as the European Union allowance (Bird et al 2004). The lCERs 
instrument addresses both of these issues to some extent. Even though there is no project yet to 
date that has been approved using this instrument, it is important to understand the potential 
implications of such a policy as forest projects are approved and the instrument is refined.  
This paper extends a growing literature on carbon sequestration instruments for forestry.  
Germain, et al. (2007) and Olschewski et al. (2005) examined the economic feasibility of carbon 
credit projects for developing countries given the new carbon crediting mechanisms for forest 
projects. However, their model did not consider the dynamic aspects of rotation interval choices 
and corresponding carbon storage. Integrating a positive value attached to a continuous flow of 
sequestered carbon dioxide emissions in optimal forest rotation models are likely to result in 
socially optimal rotation intervals that are longer than the privately selected rotation interval 
(Plantinga and Birdsey 1994). Several studies have extended the basic model. Hoen and Solberg 
(1997) and Van Kooten et al. (1995) derive the optimal carbon subsidies / taxes to internalize the 
carbon sequestration function of the forest. Spring et al. (2005) explain the effect of wildfire risk 
in sequestering forest carbon. Guthrie and Kumareswaran (2009) also incorporate the effect of 
carbon credits in rotation interval choice using actual carbon sequestered versus long run 
sequestration potential of the land in a continuous model.     5
Galinato and Uchida (forthcoming) were the first to examine the effect of implementing 
the current tCERs mechanism on the choice of rotation intervals and the supply of carbon credits. 
Galinato and Uchida (2010) extend the analysis by measuring the effectiveness of the current 
tCERs framework relative to social welfare and find that the tCERs instrument results in only a 
2% lower level of social welfare relative to the social optimum.  Our article is the first study that 
we know of that investigates the effect of lCERs, as outlined in the UNFCCC modalities and 
procedures for forest activities, on rotation intervals and carbon credit supplies of forestry 
projects.   
The discrete nature of verification periods under the CDM along with the other 
characteristics of lCERs lead to some idiosyncratic effects on rotation choice and carbon credit 
supply. Based on our theoretical model, we find that the design and implementation of a penalty 
under the lCERs is critical in determining both the length of rotation intervals as well carbon 
credit supply. Given the current guidelines for lCERs, the type of penalty has opposing 
incentives on rotation length. The penalty is an increasing function of the difference in biomass 
before and after harvesting between verifications. Thus, the landowner can reduce the nominal 
value of the penalty by shortening the rotation interval, but he can also reduce the present value 
by lengthening it. If the former effect is more (less) significant than the latter effect, the rotation 
interval is shorter (longer).   
Increasing the sequestration of carbon is the stated goal of CERs, but the structure of 
lCER penalties leads to some potentially surprising carbon sequestration outcomes. We show 
that in some cases there is a backward-bending region in the carbon sequestration supply curve. 
For some parameterizations, lCERs instruments induce very little increase in carbon 
sequestration for a given forest stand.  However, a higher carbon price increases land rents for   6
stands under lCER certification, so lCERs provide the incentive for land conversion from other 
uses to forestry. Taken together, the results of our model have important policy implications 
especially with regard to carefully designing the penalty and highlight the potential effect of 
lCERs in afforestation and reforestation projects that adopt such an instrument.   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: the next section provides an overview of the 
current guidelines for generating lCERs with afforestation and reforestation programs under the 
CDM and compares it with tCERs. Section 3 presents the theoretical model for lCERs that solves 
for optimal rotation intervals under an infinite rotation horizon. Section 4 summarizes results 
from simulations in the Philippines and Tanzania. Section 5 concludes the study. 
2. An Overview of Temporary and Long Term Certified Emission Reductions 
Under the CDM, forestry projects that wish to be credited with tCERs or lCERs are 
subject to a number of participation criteria and technical standards. The host country must have 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol and established a Designated National Authority (DNA) that 
determines the feasibility of crediting projects within the country. To be eligible, a proposed 
forest project must not be required by national or local law, and the targeted land must be 
without forest cover between December 31, 1989 and the starting date of the project. Under the 
current rules, tCERs and lCERs forest projects can last from 20 to 60 years depending on the 
type of trees, other economic policies and environmental factors (UNFCCC 2003).  
Figure 1 demonstrates how lCERs are generated under a multiple rotation system for a 
hypothetical forest project. The landowner chooses the first crediting verification of sequestered 
carbon at any point after the forest project starts (UNFCCC 2003). After the first verification, the 
subsequent verification periods take place every five years until the end of the project (UNFCCC 
2003).  At each verification period, the DNA verifies and issues certified lCERs based upon the   7
marginal (additional) carbon sequestered from the previous verification period to the current 
verification period. In the example in Figure 1, the project starts in the year 2010 and the first 
verification period is chosen by the landowner in year 2012. After the initial verification, 
verification and issuance of lCERs occurs every five years thereafter, so the next verification 
periods are 2017, 2022 and so on until the end of the project at year 2032.  
LCERs purchased by firms are valid as CO2e offsets through the end of the crediting 
period (of up to maximum 60 years) and depends on incremental gains (and losses) in biomass.  
If a landowner sells lCERs early in the crediting period based on expected biomass accumulation 
but there is a subsequent loss in biomass due to harvesting or any other event, the landowner may 
be required to replace or remunerate the buyer for this reduction in lCERs (UNFCCC 2003; Bird 
et al. 2004). Alternatively, the landowner may choose to retire lCERs altogether and not sell 
them. The landowner can still earn additional revenue from sequestered carbon in subsequent 
verifications as long as the volume of trees in subsequent verifications is larger than previous 
verifications. 
  Projects that adopt tCERs are subject to the same participation criteria and technical 
standards as lCERs. TCERs are issued every five years following the initial crediting 
verification. The amount of tCERs generated is based on total amount sequestered in a given 
verification period. Also, tCERs expire after five years once the subsequent tCER has been 
issued, thus they are termed “temporary” (UNFCCC 2003). If there is any loss in biomass, there 
is no penalty since validity of tCERs is not dependent on project length and loss of biomass 
(UNFCCC 2006). Figure 2 illustrates an example of tCERs. Here, the first verification occurs in 
year 2012. Thus, subsequent verification periods occur at years 2017, 2022 and 2027. The 
corresponding amount of carbon credits generated are based on the cumulative amount of carbon   8
sequestered as shown in the vertical axis on the right hand side. Loss in biomass due to 
harvesting has no impact on validity of tCERs but can affect the amount of carbon credited in the 
next verification cycle. 
3. Infinite rotation model for Long Term Certified Emission Reductions 
We integrate two important characteristics of the lCERs instrument into an optimal 
rotation model. First, lCERs are based on additional carbon sequestered from one verification 
period to the next. Second, we account for the loss of any biomass during harvest as a penalty 
based on the marginal reduction of carbon sequestered between verification periods.
2  
We suppose that a landowner maximizes the net present value of forest activities by 
selecting optimal forest rotation intervals in an infinite time horizon for an even-aged stand. We 
consider timber revenues and certified lCERs as the primary benefits by the landowner where the 
latter are earned in a 60-year crediting period during the forest project. In an infinite rotation 
model with lCERs, the rotation intervals can be grouped into two types. The first is the rotations 
after the 60-year crediting period expires and the second is during the crediting period when 
lCERs are created by incremental carbon sequestration.  We solve the model in two parts by 
deriving the optimal harvest without carbon credits to derive the value function. Next, we 
substitute the value function into the main objective function to solve for the rotations during the 
crediting period. 
3.1 Rotations after the carbon crediting period 
After the maximum 60-year crediting period, the landowner earns value only from 
timber. Assuming constant net timber price, discount rate and planting cost, the discounted profit 
from forest rotations after the crediting period, a, is equal to 
                                                            
2 One alternative option would be to disallow landowners to sell carbon credits based on the amount of reduced 
sequestered carbon; however, adding in a penalty is equivalent and more expedient mathematically.   9
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where pc is a constant carbon market price per unit of sequestered carbon,  is carbon conversion 
coefficient of the tree, tv is the initial date of verification, j represents a verification period, and n1 
is the number of verification periods after tv. The first verification generates the first carbon 
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carbon revenues during subsequent verifications are equal to the second term in (2).   10
  For subsequent forest stand rotations, carbon revenues continue to be earned based on 
incremental carbon sequestration between verification periods. However, a penalty is applied at 
the following verification period after harvest because the amount of carbon biomass is less than 
the amount of carbon biomass prior to harvest. Thus, the net carbon revenues during any 
subsequent forest stand rotation interval i, Ri, after the first rotation until the last rotation before 
the end of the 60-year crediting period, m, can be written as 
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where ti and ni are the optimal rotation interval and number of verifications during the i
th rotation, 
respectively. The first term of (3) represents the carbon revenues generated from the additional 
carbon sequestered between the verification periods within the i
th forest rotation. The second 
term represents a penalty that is incurred to the landowner when timber harvesting decreases 
carbon biomass between the (i-1)
th and i
th rotations. 
The total value of the forestry project during the 60 year project is the sum of the net 
present value of timber and carbon revenues in equations (2) and (3): 
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subject to constraints (5) and (6). The landowner selects m rotation intervals where carbon 
revenues are earned, t1… tm, and the initial verification period during the first rotation interval, tv, 
that determines the total number of verification periods within the 60-year crediting period. 
The Lagrangean of the landowner’s problem is formulated as 
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  Several cases are possible during the project period due to the constraints. When all 
constraints are non-binding, all Lagrangean multipliers are equal to zero. The initial verification 
period is chosen such that the marginal opportunity cost of carbon revenues will equal the value 
of the marginal product of carbon biomass as shown in (10).  
When all the Lagrangean multipliers are equal to zero, Equation (9) indicates that the 
transition rotation interval, tm, is equal to the Faustmann rotation interval. This occurs because 
there is no impact of carbon revenues on the rotation interval when the last verification period in 
the last rotation does not coincide with the harvest date. 
For all other rotation intervals, i = 1 to m-1, manipulation of (8) provides 
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(13) 
The marginal revenue of harvesting is equal to the marginal opportunity cost of harvested timber 
during the i
th rotation. The opportunity cost of harvesting includes the foregone opportunity of 
timber investment in current and all other future rotations, and the foregone opportunity for   14
carbon revenues during all future verification periods. Marginal revenue from harvest consists of 
the marginal value of timber as well as the marginal returns from delaying the penalty.  
The landowner can mitigate the penalty in two ways based on (13). First, because the 
penalty is established based on the difference in volume levels between two verification periods 
spanning a harvest, the landowner can reduce the nominal value of the penalty by harvesting 
earlier as shown by the second term of the left hand side on (13). Doing so reduces the difference 
between biomass volume from the two surrounding verification periods because the marginal 
rate of carbon sequestration is higher for younger trees. On the other hand, the present value of a 
penalty can be reduced by increasing the number of verifications within a rotation and 
subsequently lengthening the rotation period, as shown in the second term in (13). 
The tradeoff described above has the potential to affect which side of a given verification 
harvest occurs.  In fact, if the penalty is significant, the harvest date may be pushed all the way to 
the end of the project to avoid incurring the penalty. If this is the case, the choice of timber 
revenues and the initial verification period are independent from each other, and lCERs may not 
induce a longer rotation interval. This result occurs due to the discrete nature of the verification 
periods for carbon credits. Since verification periods that earn carbon revenues for the 
landowners occur in five-year intervals, the marginal benefits from carbon sequestration is equal 
to zero at the time of harvest when the time of verification does not coincide with the harvesting 
period. If this is the case, the lCER’s only effect on carbon sequestration is through its effect on 
land rent from forest production which increases the amount of land under forest cover.  
When the first constraints are binding (i > 0 for i =1 … m) and the final constraint is not 
binding (z  = 0), the optimal rotation interval without carbon revenues can be solved 
independently from the other choice variables.  When the first i through m  constraints are   15
binding, the first rotation equals t1 = tv +5n1 and for all rotation intervals from 2 to m we have ti 
= 5ni. The two remaining variables that must be solved are t1 and tv. Substituting (10) into (8) for 
i=1 and recognizing that subsequent rotation intervals follow the above expressions, the optimal 
condition that yields the 1
st rotation interval is,
3 
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The right hand side of (14) states that the marginal opportunity cost of harvesting is 
compromised of three elements: the opportunity cost of carbon revenues (first term), the 
opportunity cost of timber during all rotations (second term) and the opportunity cost of land 
(third term). The summation of all three marginal opportunity cost components is equated to the 
marginal value of timber, marginal value of carbon biomass in the 1
st rotation, and the marginal 
value of delaying the penalty. Compared to the case where harvest dates and the last verification 
period do not coincide, the optimal rotation intervals may be longer or shorter than the case 
where the last verification period and harvest date coincide because of the penalty.  
The lCERs model is closest to Van Kooten et al. (1995) where subsidies occur during net 
carbon absorption and taxes occur during harvest in a continuous framework. The main 
difference with lCERs is the discrete nature of the verification period and the landowner’s ability 
to choose the initial verification period. 
                                                            
3 We derive tv by replacing the first rotation interval into the binding constraint. It is interesting to note that even 
though the first rotation yields an equilibrium between marginal opportunity cost and marginal benefit of harvest, for 
all other rotation intervals this may not be the case.   16
4. Simulations 
  We simulate the optimal rotation intervals and initial verification periods under the 
lCERs policy. Galinato and Uchida (forthcoming) investigate the effect of the tCERs policy by 
simulating stylized plantations from two tree species: Mahogany, a slow growing tree species in 
the Philippines, and Neem, a fast growing tree species in Tanzania. To compare the effect of 
lCERs and tCERs, we use the same tree species and parameters. 
4.1 Parameters and Functional Forms 
Mahogany (Swietenia macrophylla) has the largest potential for carbon sequestration 
among all tropical trees in the Philippines (Covar, 1998) with a volume function 
 , 10
)] / * 78406 . 0 ( ) * 053801 . 0 ( ) / 6721 . 6 ( 7348 . 1 [ A S S A V
     (15) 
where V is the standing timber volume in cubic meters per hectare, A is timber age in years, and 
S is the site index value (Revilla, et al., 1976).  
The growth function of Tanzanian Neem (Azadirachta indica) is (Tewari and Kumar, 
2002) 
  V = 105.84133*[1 - exp(-0.10582*A)]
2.11913. (16) 
The amount of carbon sequestered for each tree species is calculated using 
  TC = V * WD * Cs * Cw, (17) 
where TC is the carbon coefficient in tons of carbon per hectare (tC/ha); WD is the wood density; 
Cs is the conversion factor to compute whole stand biomass from stemwood biomass; and Cw is 
the conversion factor to estimate the carbon content of whole stand biomass of carbon per ton 
(Winjum et al. 1992). 
Table 1 summarizes the parameters used in the model for the two species. The discount 
rate and price of carbon are important in determining rotation intervals, the initial verification   17
period and the feasibility of establishing carbon forest plantations. A competitive carbon price is 
equal to the marginal damages of carbon. Tol (2005) estimates the mean marginal damage as $93 
per ton of permanent carbon (tC).
4  We set $100/tC as baseline price for our simulation and use a 
range of carbon prices from $0 to $100/tC to examine the effects of carbon price differences. We 
also allow for low and high discount rates using 5% and 10% as well as different timber prices 
for each species. 
4.2 Economic Feasibility of lCERs 
  In order for the host country to establish forest plantations in a particular site, the project 
needs to be economically feasible. The forest project is economically feasible in an infinite 
rotation model if the soil expectation value (SEV), which is the maximum present value of net 
benefits during all rotations from equation (7), is positive. Table 2 summarizes the SEV in the 
Philippines and Tanzania.  
The Philippines has a larger SEV than Tanzania when the discount rate is 5% but the 
opposite result is observed at a 10% discount rate. This suggests that slow (fast) growing trees 
species are favored at a low (high) project discount rate. The forest projects are economically 
feasible even without additional carbon revenues. However, without carbon revenues, however, 
landowners may bear negative annual returns because no profits are gained until the optimal 
harvesting date. Impatient landowners that are risk averse or who have no foresight are unlikely 
to start such a project without any initial or early returns from their planting investment. Carbon 
revenues during each verification period help increase SEV and offset some of the opportunity 
cost of the land (Sedjo, 1999).  
                                                            
4 Carbon uptake into biological sinks are usually measured in tons of carbon while emissions reductions are in tons 
of carbon dioxide. By using the conversion factor of 12 tC / 44 tCO2, $93 / tC is equal to about $25 / tCO2. This is 
within the range of the strike price (and slightly higher than the average spot price) of CERs in European Carbon 
Exchange in 2009 (ECX, 2009).   18
To compare the SEV from carbon under lCERs versus tCERs, we need to make the 
carbon price of tCERs and lCERs comparable. Galinato and Uchida (forthcoming) estimate that 
a carbon price of lCERs equal to $100/tC is equivalent to approximately $20/tC of tCERs 
assuming a 5% discount rate. For tCERs, computed SEVs for Philippine Mahogany and 
Tanzanian Neem are $6093 and $5634, respectively when the tCERs carbon price is $20/tC 
(Galinato and Uchida forthcoming). The SEVs under lCERs using a carbon price of $100/tC are 
slightly larger than those of tCERs. This implies that a profit-maximizing, risk-neutral landowner 
would likely choose to apply for an lCERs program rather than a tCERs program. However, a 
risk-averse farmer may not necessarily choose the same program given potential future 
uncertainties in the project.  
4.3 Optimal rotation intervals and initial verification period with lCERs 
  Tables 3 and 4 summarize optimal rotation intervals and initial verification period choice 
under lCERs for Philippine Mahogany and Tanazanian Neem, respectively.
5 Simulated values 
for tCERs from Galinato and Uchida (forthcoming) are also presented for comparison. The 
Faustmann rotation age is 31.5 years for Mahogany and 9.8 years for Neem when the discount 
rate is 5%. At higher values of carbon prices, lower timber prices and lower discount rates, the 
optimal rotation interval is longer. Similar to the case where tCERs are generated, rotation 
intervals during the project are not necessarily the same. 
There is only one rotation fully incorporated in the 60 year crediting period for 
Mahogany at a 10% discount rate. This is in contrast to the tCERs case where there are two full 
rotations within 60 years under the same conditions. When the lCERs policy is established, 
landowners have an incentive to lengthen rotation intervals to avoid incurring a harvesting 
                                                            
5 We use Mathematica 5.2 in our simulations. The notebook files are available from the authors upon request.   19
penalty. In order to fully avoid the penalty, the landowner can wait until the end of the project 
after 60 years as shown in the case where the discount rate is 10%. 
  For Tanzania, there may be 4 to 7 complete rotations within the 60-year project 
depending on the price parameters and discount rates. The most significant difference between 
tCERs and lCERs occurs especially when carbon prices reach $100 per ton of carbon. Under 
tCERs, the price increases rotation intervals up to 10 years but this is not the case with lCERs. 
The effect of a harvesting penalty may again explain why this occurs. Delaying harvest reduces 
the present value of the penalty, all things equal. However, it may also increase the nominal 
value of the penalty because it increases the distance between the volume before and after 
harvest. Thus, landowners may not increase rotations intervals too much in the presence of a 
harvesting penalty. 
  It appears under the lCERs program that the initial verification period is chosen so that 
the harvest date during the first rotation interval coincides with the last verification period. The 
initial verification period starts as early as year 1 of the first rotation or as long as year 5. The 
initial verification choice, however, does not guarantee that the last verification period during 
each subsequent rotation interval corresponds to the harvest date. This result is similar to the 
tCERs program. 
  In general, an increase in carbon price does increase the optimal rotation interval under 
lCERs, however, the effect is not as dramatic as under tCERs. Given a discount rate of 5% and a 
timber price of $171.47 per cubic meter, rotation intervals increase from 35 to 60 years under 
tCERs when going from $20/tC to $100/tC. Given the same parameters, the rotation interval 
increases from 30 to 35 years under lCERs. This is likely due to the way in which certified 
emission reductions are counted. Recall that tCERs are based on total volume during the   20
verification while lCERs are based on marginal volume from the previous verification period. 
Under tCERs, there is a greater incentive to increase rotation intervals longer because marginal 
carbon revenue during each verification period increases as long as the tree continues to grow. 
However, under lCERs, there is less incentive to keep the rotation longer because marginal 
carbon revenues decrease because the growth of trees increase at a decreasing rate.  
  Some rotation intervals with lCERs may be shorter than the case with no carbon 
revenues. For example, in Philippine mahogany when the carbon price is $50 and $100 with the 
timber price of $342.94 per cubic meter, the rotation interval with lCERs is 30 years while the 
optimal rotation interval is 31.1 years without carbon revenues. The theoretical model suggest 
that the nominal value of the penalty can be reduced by decreasing the rotation length since 
doing so decreases the gap between volume of trees across rotations before and after harvest. The 
present value of the penalty can also be reduced by lengthening the rotation interval. In this case, 
the former effect outweighs the latter effect, and could therefore induce the landowner to harvest 
earlier than the Faustmann rotation. 
4.4 Supply of carbon sequestration from lCERs 
The average annual supply of carbon sequestered from lCERs is a function of the price of 
carbon and other parameters of the model. The supply of lCERs is affected by the rotation length 
during the 60-year crediting period as well as the initial verification choice.   
Figure 3 illustrates simulated carbon supply curves for Philippines and Tanzania. Carbon 
supply curves of the two different tree species vary substantially in timber prices and discount 
rates across. In some cases, there is an initial positive sequestration response to higher carbon 
prices, followed by no response thereafter.  For example, for Tanzanian Neem, carbon 
sequestration credits increase with carbon price up to about $20/tC, but then remain   21
approximately unchanged.  In other cases (one case for Tanzania and two cases for the 
Phillipines), carbon sequestration is perfectly inelastic with respect to carbon price, and there is 
effectively little or no response especially as trees approach the maximum volume function.   
Finally, there are cases in which the carbon supply curve bends backwards and then 
increase again, such as Tanzanian Neem at a timber price of $106.67 and r=0.1 in Figure 3. This 
particular shape of the supply curve from lCERs can be attributed to the penalty imposed in the 
first verification after harvest.  Recall that there are opposing incentives for the landowner to 
shorten or lengthen the rotation interval to avoid or reduce the penalty. When carbon prices are 
relatively low, marginal increases in the carbon price can increase rotation length leading to 
more carbon credits. However, over a higher range of carbon prices, the incentive to avoid the 
penalty is significant. Because the penalty is based on the difference in volume of trees before 
and after harvest, the landowner has an incentive to reduce the penalty by shortening the rotation 
interval thereby reducing this difference. Alternatively, the penalty can be pushed back to a later 
date reducing the present value of the penalty. Over a carbon price range of $50/tC to $100/tC 
when the interest rate is 10% for the Philippines, carbon supply decreases; rotation intervals are 
shorter because the former effect dominates the latter effect. Once the carbon price goes beyond 
$100/tC for Philippine Mahogany, carbon revenues become very significant and the latter effect 
now dominates the former effect. 
It is clear from Figure 3 that there are limits to the incentive and ability to increase carbon 
biomass on a given plot of land.  For Tanzanian Neem, annual accredited carbon dioxide 
sequestration does not go above about 0.95 metric tons per hectare per year for the lower timber 
price ($106.67) and does not go above about 0.60 metric tons per hectare per year for the lower 
timber price ($213.34) and higher discount rate.  The former limit corresponds to a longer   22
rotation length, and the latter corresponds to a shorter rotation length. It is important to 
remember that even though there are limits to carbon sequestration supply response at the 
intensive margin the lCERs mechanism provides an incentive to move more land into forestry, 
thereby likely increasing carbon sequestration.  In the case of Neem at a timber price of $213.34 
and an interest rate of 10%, returns to carbon have little effect on carbon supply at all. This is 
mainly because carbon revenues, in this case, are a small proportion in total earnings for the 
landowner, and therefore has little effect on rotation choice when timber prices are high.   
LCER-based carbon supply curves differ significantly from tCER-based carbon supply 
curves. Galinato and Uchida (forthcoming) obtain strictly increasing carbon supply curves 
asymptotic to the maximum production capacity of the tree without any backward bending areas. 
The main difference between the two policies that significantly affects the shape of the supply 
curves is the presence and design of the penalty. 
We find that the price of timber and the discount rate significantly affects the degree to 
which the supply curve bends backwards. When the price of timber is relatively low and the 
discount rate is relatively high, the range in which the supply curve bends backward is larger for 
both tree species. This is consistent with our explanation based on the design of the penalty 
because relatively lower timber prices imply that the share of carbon revenues in the total net 
earnings of the landowner is larger. Also, the higher discount rate implies that the future value of 
a penalty is substantially lower when harvesting is pushed to a later date. The landowner will be 
more sensitive to changes in carbon prices given these two cases.   
5. Conclusion 
Implementing long term certified emission reductions under the Clean Development 
Mechanism has some interesting and, for practical policy implementation, problematic effects on   23
optimal rotation intervals and carbon credit generation of afforestation or reforestation programs. 
Adopting lCERs could result in heterogeneous rotation intervals because verification periods are 
administered in five-year intervals. The structure of the penalty during harvest could induce 
longer or shorter rotation intervals than the case without any harvesting penalties. Theoretically, 
the landowner can decrease the present value of the penalty by delaying harvest later for a 
constant penalty amount. However, the nominal value of the penalty is increasing in rotation 
interval length because it is based on the difference in volume before harvest and after harvest. 
Because of this interplay between the timing of penalties vis-à-vis harvest, practical efforts to 
predict or induce specific forest owner sequestration behavior at the intensive margin are likely 
to be imprecise. 
In our simulations, we find several idiosyncratic characteristics of carbon supply at the 
intensive margin.  In some parameterizations of timber price and interest rates, there is a 
backward bending region of the supply curve, which tends to be more pronounced when timber 
prices are relatively low and discount rates are high. In general, different parameterizations lead 
to substantially different asymptotes of carbon supply in response to carbon price.  In some 
instances, there is little carbon supply response at the intensive margin.  
Despite the complications and weaknesses of tCERs and lCERs, they do predictably 
increase soil expectation values from forestry. To the extent that standing forests are an effective 
medium for sequestering carbon relative to other land uses, remuneration for carbon 
sequestration via these instruments will tend to result in land conversion toward forestry. 
One interesting question from a welfare standpoint is to derive how far the lCERs 
mechanism is from maximum social welfare and compare these results with tCERs. Given the 
inefficiencies of implementing tCERs, Galinato and Uchida (2010) measured the amount of   24
social welfare lost compared to a socially optimal policy and found only a 2% loss in social 
welfare with the tCERs policy at most. It would be useful to measure such welfare losses for 
lCERs. Another interesting question for future research is a comparison of the adoption of such a 
policy between risk-averse landowners. From our analysis, risk-neutral agents who maximize 
profit likely compare surplus between tCERs and lCERs in deciding what instrument to generate. 
In this case, one would derive higher returns from lCERs, all else equal. However, given 
potential uncertainty in the growth of trees and carbon uptake potential of different species, it 
would be interesting to see how risk-averse agents would view the two programs.    25
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Tables 
Table 1  Parameters of the model 
Parameter definition 
Mahogany in the 
Philippines 
Neem in Tanzania 
Timber price (pv) per cubic meter 
 
 171.47 106.67 
Harvesting cost (h) per cubic meter 
 
35.23   21.33
Fixed cost of harvesting (Q) per hectare 
 
803.97 156.89 
Site index (I) 
 
25   N/A
Wood density (WD) tons per cubic meter  0.56   0.52 
Conversion factor to compute whole-stand 
biomass from stem wood biomass (Cs) 
1.6 1.2
Conversion factor to estimate the carbon content 
of whole stand biomass (Cw) 
0.5  0.5
Sources: Galinato and Uchida (forthcoming).   30
Table 2 Per Hectare Soil Expectation Value of Carbon Forest Plantations with lCERs in the 
Philippines and Tanzania in an Infinite Rotation Planning Horizon (2001 US$) 
Discount Rate  5%  10% 
Price of 
Carbon 
$0 $20 $50  $100  $0 $20  $50  $100 
Philippines 
Net Benefits  
from Timber 
$5417.01  $5409.15 $5385.87  $5299.26 $435.82 $449.17 $449.17 $429.64 
Net Benefits 
from Carbon 
including 
penalty 
$0 $296.95  $767.03  $1649.79  $0 $97.44  $240.91  $475.19 
Soil 
Expectation 
Value (SEV) 
$5417.01  $5706.1  $6152.90  $6949.05 $435.82 $546.61 $690.08 $904.83 
Tanzania 
Net Benefits  
from Timber 
$5243.09 $5254.54  $5254.54 $5237.98  $1964.42 $1962.83 $1959.65 $1940.59 
Net Benefits 
from Carbon 
including 
penalty 
$0 $138.80  $347.01  $712.49  $0 $73.66  $188.50  $409.95 
Soil 
Expectation 
Value (SEV)  
$5243.09 $5393.34  $5601.55 $5950.47  $1964.42 $2036.49 $2148.15 $2350.54 
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Table 3 Optimal Rotation and Initial Verification Periods in the Philippines in an Infinite Rotation Planning Horizon Under LCERS 
and TCERs 
  Long Term Certified Emission Reductions (LCERs)  Temporary Certified Emission Reductions (TCERs)
1
Discount Rate  5%  10%  5%  10% 
Price of Carbon 
($/metric ton) 
$0  $20  $50  $100  $0  $20  $50  $100  $0  $5  $20  $100  $0  $5  $20  $100 
pv = 171.47      
Initial verification 
year (tv*) 
N/A  5  3  5  N/A  1  1  1  N/A  2  5  5  N/A  5  1  5 
1st Rotation length 
(t1* ) 
31.5  30  33  35  24.2  26  26  27  31.5  32  35  60  24.2  25  26  35 
2nd Rotation length 
(t2* ) 
31.5  31.5  31.5  31.5  24.2  35  35  34  31.5  31.5  31.5  31.5  24.2  25  25  25 
Rotations after 
crediting 
period (tf＊) 
31.5  31.5  31.5  31.5  24.2  24.2  24.2  24.2  31.5  31.5  31.5  31.5  24.2  24.2  24.2  24.2 
pv = 342.94      
Initial verification 
year (tv*) 
N/A  5  5  5  N/A  1  1  1  N/A  2  3  5  N/A  4  4  2 
1st Rotation length 
(t1* ) 
31.1  31  30  30  23.7  26  26  26  31.1  32  33  45  23.7  24  24  27 
2nd Rotation length 
(t2* ) 
31.1  31.1  31.1  31.1  23.7  35  35  35  31.1  31.1  31.1  31.1  23.7  25  25  30 
Rotations after 
crediting 
period (tf＊) 
31.1  31.1  31.1  31.1  23.7  23.7  23.7  23.7  31.1  31.1  31.1  31.1  23.7  23.7  23.7  23.7 
Note: N/A means not applicable. 
1 Simulation results for tCERs are obtained from Galinato and Uchida (forthcoming).   32
Table 4 Optimal Rotation and Initial Verification Periods in the Tanzania in an Infinite Rotation Planning Horizon Under LCERS and 
TCERs 
  Long Term Certified Emission Reductions (LCERs) Temporary Certified Emission Reductions (TCERs)
1 
Discount Rate  5%  10%  5%  10% 
Price of Carbon ($/metric 
ton) 
$0  $20  $50  $100  $0  $20  $50  $100  $0  $5  $20  $100  $0  $5  $20  $100 
pv = 106.67      
Initial verification year 
(tv*) 
N/A  5  5  1  N/A  3  3  4  N/A  5  5  5  N/A  3  3  5 
1st Rotation length (t1* )  9.8  10  10  11  7.9  8  8  9  9.8  10  10  15  7.9  8  8  10 
2nd Rotation length (t2* )  9.8  10  10  10  7.9  8  7  7  9.8  10  10  15  7.9  8  10  10 
3rd Rotation length (t3* )  9.8  10  10  10  7.9  8  8  9  9.8  10  10  15  7.9  8  10  10 
4th Rotation length (t4* )  9.8  10  10  10  7.9  9  7  9  9.8  10  10  15  7.9  9  10  10 
5th Rotation length (t5* )  9.8  10  10  10  7.9  8  8  7  9.8  10  10   7.9  8  10  10 
6th Rotation length (t6* )  9.8  (11)  (11)  (10)  7.9  8  7  9  9.8  10  10   7.9  8  10  10 
7th Rotation length (t7* )       7.9  9  8  9         7.9  9    
Rotations after crediting 
period (tf＊) 
9.8  9.8  9.8  9.8  7.9  7.9  7.9  7.9  9.8  9.8  9.8  9.8  7.9  7.9  7.9  7.9 
pv = 213.34      
Initial verification year 
(tv*) 
N/A  5  5  5  N/A  3  3  3  N/A  5  5  5  N/A  3  3  4 
1st Rotation length (t1* )  9.5  10  10  10  7.5  8  8  8  9.5  10  10  10  7.5  8  8  9 
2nd Rotation length (t2* )  9.5  10  10  10  7.5  7  7  7  9.5  10  10  10  7.5  7  7  10 
3rd Rotation length (t3* )  9.5  10  10  10  7.5  8  8  8  9.5  10  10  10  7.5  8  8  10 
4th Rotation length (t4* )  9.5  10  10  10  7.5  7  7  7  9.5  10  10  10  7.5  7  7  10 
5th Rotation length (t5* )  9.5  10  10  10  7.5  8  8  8  9.5  10  10  10  7.5  8  8  10 
6th Rotation length (t6* )  9.5  (11)  (11)  (11)  7.5  7  7  7  9.5  10  10  10  7.5  7  7  10 
7th Rotation length (t7* )       7.5  8  8  8         7.5  8  8  
Rotations after crediting 
period (tf＊) 
9.5  9.5  9.5  9.5  7.5  7.5  7.5  7.5  9.5  9.5  9.5  9.5  7.5  7.5  7.5  7.5 
Note: N/A means not applicable. 
1 Simulation results for tCERs are obtained from Galinato and Uchida (forthcoming).   33
Figures 
Source: Based on Figures 2 and 3 of Bird et al. 
(2004). 
Figure 1 The lCERs mechanism 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 The tCERs mechanism 
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Figure 3 Carbon Supply Curves of Philippines and Tanzania. 
 